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Abstract 
In contrast to previous results combining all ages we find positive effects of comparison 
income on happiness for the under 45s, and negative effects for those over 45. In the BHPS 
these coefficients are several times the magnitude of own income effects. In GSOEP they 
cancel to give no effect of effect of comparison income on life satisfaction in the whole 
sample, when controlling for fixed effects, and time-in-panel, and with flexible, age-group 
dummies. The residual age-happiness relationship is hump-shaped in all three countries. 
Results are consistent with a simple life cycle model of relative income under uncertainty.  
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1. Introduction 
Among the most important results in happiness research, which help to explain the Easterlin 
Paradox of flat or declining average life satisfaction over time in the US and other advanced 
economies, are the strong negative effects of comparison or reference income, found in many 
different contexts, but particularly for life satisfaction in Germany and the US (Akay and 
Martinsson, 2012; D’Ambrosio and Frick, 2012; Bartolini et al., 2012; Cuesta and Budria, 
2012; FitzRoy et al., 2011a,b; Layard et al., 2010; Senik, 2009; Clark et al., 2008; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). However as Hirschman 
and Rothschild (1973) observed, just before the beginning of modern research on subjective 
well-being by Easterlin (1974), comparison with a relevant reference group could have two 
very different effects. First, the role of status, based on comparison, which had already been 
emphasized by classical economists such as Smith and Mill, and by Veblen (1899), and more 
recently by sociologists as ‘relative deprivation’ (Runciman 1966), refers to evaluation of 
one’s own current situation compared to the relevant reference group. However, Hirschman 
and Rothschild (1973) argued in the context of economic development and resulting 
inequality combined with rapid growth, that comparison could also indicate one’s own future 
(relative) prospects. Thus a higher reference income in this context might be perceived as only 
a temporary ‘relative deprivation’, but also as an indicator of better future prospects, which 
they denoted ‘the tunnel effect’, with an inherently ambiguous net result on current subjective 
well-being.  
While such effects in developing countries are plausible, there is also a natural asymmetry in 
likely response to relative income across age groups, which has received much less attention. 
Young individuals everywhere are obviously more mobile and likely to see peer success as an 
indication of their own future prospects, (and perhaps be motivated to greater effort), than less 
flexible, older people. The careers of the latter group are fully determined at the latest by 
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retirement, so expectations lose relevance and current perceptions of relative status should 
dominate.  
This asymmetry suggests estimating the effects of relative income separately for younger and 
older sub-samples, and here we generalize our earlier cross sectional results, which reported 
the first estimates for different age groups1 and use the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to estimate life-satisfaction 
separately for sub-samples of individuals under and over 45, as well as for the complete 
samples with all ages. We control for the time spent in the panels, and for age with flexible 
age-group dummies, and find a number of new results which differ from the previous 
literature.  
With all ages, but controlling for time spent in the panel, and individual fixed effects to 
capture reverse causality and selection (Frijters and Beatton, 2012), we find no effects of 
comparison income with the GSOEP. This differs from previous studies with GSOEP cited 
above, which all find large negative effects of comparison income using the full sample. The 
reason for this seems to be our use of flexible age dummies. With the usual quadratic age 
control we also find a negative comparison effect in the full sample. 
Our main innovation is to actually find a positive significant effect of comparison income for 
those under 45, as well as the usual negative significant effect for the older group in West 
Germany, (confirming our earlier cross-section results), and these effects essentially cancel 
when all ages are aggregated. Using pooled OLS we do find a negative comparison effect for 
the whole sample in West Germany, and again the switch in sign from the young to the old 
(as in our earlier OLS cross section). Interacting age intervals with reference income yields a 
similar declining – from positive to negative – effect on happiness with age, as also found by 
Akay and Martinsson (2012), who combine East and West German data (and report similar 
                                                          
1
 In FitzRoy et al. (2011a, b, c) we used only the 2008 SOEP wave, but obtained many qualitatively similar 
results.  With wave 17 of the BHPS we only found an aggregate negative significant effect of comparison.  
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effects from an experimental survey in Sweden). However for East Germany we find 
comparison effects for the complete sample and the sub-samples are zero, and other 
coefficients also differ, (in contrast to Ferrer-i-Carbonell, (2005), who found negative 
comparison effects for both East and West while aggregating all ages and using the usual age 
quadratic).  
We also obtain similar results for the UK with the BHPS, which appear to be new. Here the 
comparison effect is negative for the complete sample with both pooled OLS and fixed 
effects. We find comparison effects for both age groups to be several times larger than very 
small (though highly significant) own-income effects in the UK, in striking contrast to 
Germany where magnitudes are similar, as they are in the US in Layard et al. (2010). Already 
small, own income effects decline with age in the UK, in contrast to both German regions.  
Thus fundamental results of happiness research change dramatically with flexible age 
controls, time-in-panel, and fixed effects, and after disaggregating by age: the seemingly 
robust negative effect of reference income disappears in the all-age SOEP samples, and turns 
positive in younger sub-samples in all our countries, (a result which is consistent with 
Hirschman and Rothschild’s (1973) pioneering analysis, though not directly predicted by 
them), but remains strongly negative for older individuals.2 And comparison income has no 
effect in the full sample in both parts of Germany, (and is actually insignificant in both age 
groups with fixed effects in East Germany). 
Most happiness studies (including work on relative income cited above) control for age with a 
quadratic and find a robust U-shaped pure age effect (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008), 
though this does not capture the declining happiness of the oldest respondents in samples with 
all ages and cubic or non-parametric age controls (Fischer, 2009; Bartolini et al., 2012; 
FitzRoy et al., 2011; Wunder et al., 2013). With fixed effects and controls for time in panel 
                                                          
2
 Negative comparison effects are often misleadingly described as ‘envy’, which does not capture preference for 
fairness. 
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and survey interview, (but no comparison income), Frijters and Beatton (2012) and 
Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2012) show that the U-shape or middle-age decline in 
happiness disappears. We include comparison income as well as age-intervals, wave 
dummies, and time in panel, and with fixed effects find a hump-shape, (with only a moderate 
decline in happiness after 75), in West Germany and the UK. Only East Germany reveals a 
substantial dip in middle age, and a deeper fall after 75. These results are illustrated in Figure 
1, Appendix 1. 
We have also formalised some of these ideas in a simple 2-period, life-cycle model with 
uncertainty, (Appendix 2). Depending on parameters, some members of the younger cohort 
may find that comparison income can signal either higher or lower expected lifetime relative 
income, and hence expected life satisfaction. In the second period, realised relative incomes 
have the usual effect. This is not a general model of relative income, since we do not consider 
optimizing responses to information and other issues, and focus on exogenous shocks to the 
labour market, and it does not predict all our results, but it does capture one novel result of 
the empirical analysis, namely the possibly positive (signalling) effect of higher comparison 
income on some members of a young cohort’s expected well-being, an effect which is lost 
under the usual aggregation of age groups. 
The plan of the paper is to provide a brief review of other tests of the signalling or tunnel 
hypothesis in section 2, followed by discussion of the SOEP and BHPS data and empirical 
results followed by robustness tests in section 3. Conclusions are summarized in section 4, 
and tables and a plot of age effects are in Appendix 1. The life-cycle model is in Appendix 2. 
 
2. Other tests of the tunnel hypothesis and related literature 
Hirschman and Rothschild’s (1973) ideas were long neglected, and earlier tests of these ideas 
have produced conflicting results. Thus Drichoutis et al. (2010) found insignificant effects of 
comparison income for the transition economies of Eastern Europe, in contrast to Senik 
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(2008, 2004), who obtained positive effects of reference income on life-satisfaction or 
financial satisfaction for most transition economies and Russia. She ascribes this contrast to 
‘old’ Europe, with mainly negative effects of reference income, to social and economic 
turmoil after transition and consequent high mobility. Less plausibly, Senik (2008) also finds 
a strong positive or signalling effect of reference income on happiness in the US, attributed to 
high perceived mobility, but this result is directly contradicted by Layard et al. (2010), using 
the same GSS data, and by Luttmer (2005) and others with various data sets.  
A different kind of test of the signalling effect of comparison income has been carried out by 
Clark et al. (2009), using Danish establishment wage data, and finding that job-satisfaction is 
higher in establishments with higher average pay, which plausibly signals one’s own 
prospects for promotion in the future. Interestingly in the light of our findings below and our 
life-cycle model, they find less effect for those near retirement. However, it is also likely that 
higher average pay will be correlated with work-place public goods as part of rent-sharing 
with workers, which may explain part of the observed influence. 
Most of the earlier related literature does not directly address the tunnel hypothesis, but 
emphasizes the negative effects of comparison. Thus in an early study with UK data for 
employees, Clark and Oswald (1996) found a strong negative effect of reference income on 
job-satisfaction (which is generally an important component of life-satisfaction), equal in 
magnitude and opposite in sign to the own-income effect. Card et al. (2012) also find a 
negative effect of higher comparison income on job-satisfaction, when this information is first 
revealed to co-workers. There is also evidence for the importance of comparison in general 
from neuroscience (Fliessbach et al., 2007), and from much work in psychology and 
behavioural economics as reviewed by Clark et al. (2009). Our work suggests that it is vital to 
control for position in the life-cycle to distinguish between positive and negative effects, and 
also for individual fixed effects and ‘reverse causality’, because much happiness-enhancing 
behaviour and disposition is already imparted in early childhood (Headey et al., 2012). People 
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with these early advantages go on to be healthier and more successful in careers and personal 
relationships, all of which are themselves major contributors to later well-being (Frijters and 
Beatton, 2012). 
An alternative approach to distinguishing the status or positional, relative deprivation effect 
of comparison income from the signalling or tunnel effect by D’Ambrosio and Frick (2012) is 
to add lagged income in a dynamic context. They confirm familiar, opposite-signed status 
effects of income distances from richer and poorer individuals in the whole sample, and also 
interpret a negative effect of comparison with people who are currently poorer but were richer 
in the previous period as a signal of possible loss of own future status. The importance of 
signalling thus also emerges in a very different context from our age-related, peer group 
comparison. Senik (2009) also considers dynamics, and compares various reference incomes 
for transition countries, including past own income. She finds stronger negative effects of 
relative decline than positive effects of relative gain, thus confirming loss aversion in this 
context. Another extension of the standard income comparison due to Cuesta and Budria 
(2012) and Bellami and D’Ambrosio (2010) includes deprivation measures in various non-
monetary, social and consumption domains, which turn out to be independently important for 
well-being. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
Our dependent variable is an individual’s self-reported life-satisfaction. Our main explanatory 
variables of interest are individual and comparison or reference income, which are both 
measured at the household level.3 Instead of the usual quadratic in age we use age dummies 
for 10 year intervals. For the identification of the comparison or reference income, we make 
the standard assumption that an individual compares his/her own income with the average 
income of people who are in the same age range, have the same gender and have attained a 
                                                          
3
 We control for size of household, and number of children. 
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similar education level. We therefore define an individual’s reference group by age, education 
region and gender. With respect to age, we assume that an individual compares with peers in a 
similar age range. In particular, we use rolling 10-year-age intervals by assuming that an 
individual compares at point t with all peers up to 3 years younger and 6 years older. 
Motivated by large and persisting socio-economic and cultural differences between West and 
East Germany (Pfaff and Hirata, 2011), we estimate the same model for East and West 
Germany separately, and find substantial differences. 
To test the influence of reference income on life-satisfaction we estimate the following 
model: 
 ,)(210   AgegXYnlYnlH  (1) 
where H measures self-reported life-satisfaction, and X is a vector of individual covariates 
including individual characteristics like gender, education, employment status, self-reported 
health and time spent in the panel, as well as dummies for regions. Y captures annual 
household income of an individual, while Y describes the mean income of the corresponding 
reference group defined by age, gender, education and region. When an aggregate variable 
such as this comparison income is used with individual variables, standard errors may be 
biased downwards unless they are clustered (Moulton, 1990), so we follow Stutzer (2004) and 
report clustered standard errors. (This contrasts with previous work on relative income cited 
above, where standard errors may thus be downward-biased). With respect to age, we follow 
Frijters and Beatton (2012) and use a flexible function of age, g(Age). In particular, we 
include age-dummies with bands of 10 years. Our reference category are those respondents 
younger than 25. 
We treat life-satisfaction scores as cardinal and comparable across respondents. This 
assumption is sometimes criticised in the economic literature, but unreported estimates from a 
random effects ordered probit model are qualitatively similar to the ones reported here. This 
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is in line with the findings of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) who demonstrate that the 
assumptions impact on the empirical results, so we proceed with pooled OLS and fixed 
effects estimates as in Layard et al. (2010). 
3.1 West and East Germany 
The data used for Germany comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is 
a representative micro data set providing detailed information on individuals, families and 
households in Germany (Wagner et al. 2007). The SOEP was started in 1984 and has become 
a widely used database for social scientists. A major advantage is the comprehensive nature 
of the data set, which combines objective indicators (e.g. income, employment status, family 
structure), as well as subjective or self-assessed life-satisfaction. In this paper, we make use 
of the 2000-2010 waves of the SOEP and also split into subsamples of individuals under 45, 
and those older than (or exactly) 45. We have almost 158 thousand observations for 27,521 
individuals in West Germany, and do not constrain ages as do Layard et al. (2010). 
Self-reported life-satisfaction is measured on an 11-point scale, 0 being the lowest value, 
while 10 is reported by individuals who are very satisfied with their actual life. Household 
income is measured after deducting taxes and social insurance contributions. For the 
identification of the reference income, we define an individual’s reference group by gender, 
age (+3/-6), education (low, medium and high) and region (North, West, South-West, South). 
In the case of East Germany, we distinguish two regions (North and South).  
In the Appendix, tables 1a and 1b show brief summary statistics for West and East Germany. 
Initially, it becomes obvious that individuals in East Germany are on average less satisfied 
with their life than those living in West Germany. This pattern corresponds to the fact, that 
East Germans are more affected by unemployment and have significantly lower household 
income then West Germans. The differences in happiness and economic outcomes between 
West and East Germany holds true when we compare people within age groups. However, the 
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average life-satisfaction score in East Germany is still about 6.55, which is fairly high 
compared to self-reported happiness in the US (Layard et al. 2010). The table further shows 
that young adults in East and West Germany are on average more satisfied with their life than 
older individuals.  
Tables 2a and 2b report pooled OLS estimates for the whole sample and the two age groups 
for both regions, restricted to the key household and comparison income variables. The 
negative comparison effect in the full West German sample in column (1) matches previous 
work discussed in the Introduction. The results in column (2) highlight that reference income 
has a positive significant effect for individuals under 45. For older individuals, reference 
income has the well-known negative effect on life-satisfaction. These findings are in line with 
our earlier cross-sectional results focusing on the 2008-wave of the SOEP (FitzRoy et al. 
(2011a, b, c)).  
As expected, in East Germany the income coefficient has a larger magnitude than the one 
found for West Germany. In regions that are characterized by low income and high 
unemployment levels, own income has a higher relevance for individual well-being. In 
addition to this, results from the full sample indicate that reference income does not matter for 
individuals in East Germany. Interestingly, splitting the sample suggests that the positive 
comparison effect for the under 45s also holds in East Germany.  
In the next step, we exploit the panel structure of the SOEP and take into account individual 
time constant unobserved heterogeneity by including individual fixed effects. The 
corresponding results are presented in tables 3a and 3b. The results support our findings from 
the pooled OLS estimation: the influence of reference income is different for young and old 
people. While young people experience gains in life-satisfaction if peer income rises, older 
people experience the well-known decrease in well-being if reference income increases. An 
interesting artefact is that comparison for the young is exactly offset by the usual negative 
comparison effect for those over 45, so the net result for the whole sample is a zero 
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coefficient for comparison, differing from all previous work with GSOEP data that we are 
aware of, where age groups are aggregated and the (net) effect of comparison income is 
negative.  
In East Germany, we find no comparison effects at all. This stands in contrast to Ferrer-i-
Carbonell’s (2005) random effects probit estimates and our own estimates from the Pooled 
OLS model. The own-income coefficient is, as in the Pooled OLS model, substantially larger 
than in the Western sample, which is plausible in a poorer region. Another result is that own 
income becomes more important with age in East and West Germany.  
In tables 4a and 4b, we report estimates with interactions of comparison income with 10 year 
age-interval dummies, and an interaction for over 45.4 These obviously provide more detail 
than just the two sub-samples, but essentially confirm the main pattern, in particular the 
positive comparison effect for the under-45s in West- but not East- Germany, and the stronger 
own-income benefits for the over 45s. In the East, there is just one significant negative 
comparison effect for the 55-64 group. 
The pure age effects from the age-interval dummies in the full sample, fixed effects estimates 
(columns 1 of tables 3a and 3b) are plotted in Figure 1. They are quite different from the 
frequently found U-shape in estimates without controlling for time spent in the panel and 
presence of an interviewer, and are actually more like an inverse U-shape or hump, except 
that East Germany has a distinctive M-shaped pattern of happiness over the life-cycle. These 
results confirm Frijters and Beatton’s (2012) and Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew’s 
(2012) main finding that fixed effects and the extra controls remove the U-shape. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 All variables except comparison income are interacted with a >45 dummy, but not reported. 
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3.2  United Kingdom 
Our UK data5 are taken from Waves 6-10 and 12-18 of the British Household Panel Survey, 
(BHPS), covering a period that runs from 1996/07 to 2008/09. We use data for 153189 
observations across 25312 individuals, with those cases where there are missing values 
excluded. One point worthy of note is the deliberate over-sampling of the smaller nations of 
the UK since Wave 9 – so that about half of the individuals in the BHPS are from Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, compared to less than 20% in the underlying overall population. 
While there are differences compared to England, they are much less than between West and 
East Germany, so do not warrant separate estimates. The range of coverage of this data set – 
which focuses on issues of interest to the social sciences, and for policy purposes, across the 
members of a specific sample of households – is similarly broad as the SOEP, although 
unsurprisingly not identical. 
In the BHPS data set, self-reported life-satisfaction is measured on a 7-point scale, 1 being the 
lowest value, while 7 is reported by individuals who are very satisfied with their life overall. 
For the identification of the reference income, we define an individual’s reference group by 
gender, age (+3/-6), education (low or high), region (south of England, north of England, 
outside of England) and BHPS wave. 
In the Appendix, table 1c shows summary statistics for the BHPS data. To make approximate 
comparisons6 with overall life satisfaction in Germany, a simple linear transformation can be 
undertaken (subtract 1, then multiply by 5/3). BHPS individuals have higher overall life 
satisfaction than in East Germany, but less than in West Germany. When the complete age 
range is considered, the UK average is pretty close to its counterpart from West Germany. 
However, for the younger age group, the BHPS average is relatively lower and nearer to its 
                                                          
5
 Technically, the earlier waves of the BHPS were limited in coverage to Great Britain. In our case, this is true 
up to Wave 10. The full United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland) is covered in Waves 12-18. BHPS data 
are available via the UK Data Service (formerly the UK Data Archive). 
6
 Although a linear transformation can provide arithmetic equivalence, this does not negate underlying issues 
concerning the question of whether such scales are cardinal (with points on the scale representing equal 
distances in the strength of response) or simply ordinal (in which case the mean is a problematic concept). 
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East German equivalent. The BHPS contrasts with the SOEP, in that the older age group 
displays higher life satisfaction. This effect looks somewhat surprising, given the 23% lower 
relative household income observed for the older age group in the UK case. The cross-
country difference in age-income profile could, however, be linked to the use of a gross 
household income measure in the UK case. 
Table 2c covers pooled OLS estimates for the whole sample and the two age groups, 
reporting only household and comparison income variables. The negative effect of 
comparison income in the full UK sample is statistically significant, like the West German 
case. As in our own earlier preliminary cross-sectional work on the BHPS, the comparison 
effect in the younger group remains statistically insignificant: by inspection, however, it does 
appear significantly different (in a negative direction) from the effect among the older age 
group7. 
Fixed effects results (table 3c) include a comparison income effect, in the full sample, that is 
negative and only statistically significant at the 10% significance level. The sample split very 
clearly demonstrates the difference between the two age ranges8 – with the comparison 
income effects statistically significant and positive in the younger group, and of the opposite 
sign (but again significant) in the older group. This pattern is very similar to West Germany. 
Also, own household income has a noticeably larger effect among the younger group (in 
contrast to the results for Germany) – and this effect is, rather surprisingly, much smaller 
throughout than the impact of comparison income. It is of course also much smaller than the 
own income effect in Germany (as also found by Helliwell et al. (2012), who did not, 
however, include reference income).  
                                                          
7
 This can be confirmed by estimation for the whole sample with an interaction dummy for age 45+. 
8
 However, the age split for which results are shown in columns (2) and (3) cannot be simply expressed as a 
generalised case in column (1) – since there, under fixed effects estimation, the correlation between the two 
components of the disturbance term takes a particular value; whereas, in general, this correlation will take 
different values in each of columns (2) and (3). 
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In table 4c, column (1) pooled OLS estimation can be compared to the results shown in 
columns (2) and (3) of table 2c. The inclusion of comparison income interactions with age 
grouping dummies has negligible influence on the estimates for own household income. 
However, it becomes evident that the insignificant positive estimate for comparison income in 
column (2) of table 2c is a consequence of an effect that is becoming less positive with 
increased age9. The negative estimate for comparison income in column (3) of table 2c 
appears to originate principally from an effect in the 55-74 age range. 
The results for own household income in column (2) of table 4c correspond fairly obviously 
to those in table 3c. The fixed effects estimates for comparison income exhibit an even more 
obvious tendency towards a larger negative effect with advancing age. Although it may 
appear a little odd that none of the youngest three age groups has an overall effect of 
comparison income that seems likely to be positive and significant, it should be recalled that 
column (2) of table 4c constrains the disturbance correlation.10 
The pure age effects are plotted in Figure 1 (column 1 of tables 3c) and are very similar to 
West Germany.  
3.3 Robustness Tests 
Here we summarise the results of additional tests which support the robustness of our main 
results. 11 As a first test, we excluded the income of an individual when constructing his 
comparison income. Since comparison income was on average calculated on the basis of two 
or three hundred individual observations, excluding own income did not affect comparison 
coefficients. Second, we constructed reference groups with fixed age categories instead of 
rolling age windows. This still preserved the West German (though not the BHPS) results. 
                                                          
9
 The overall effect of comparison income is negative and significant at the 10% level for the under 25s, but is 
negative overall (albeit insignificant) for the 35-44 age group. 
10
 Results for an unreported specification with fixed effects, age group interactions and an age split either side of 
the 45th birthday, show statistically significant positive overall effects for comparison income in the younger age 
range (like in column (2) of table 3c). 
11
 Results are available from the authors on request. 
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East German comparison income was consistently insignificant. Thirdly, we estimated 
reduced specifications excluding controls like health, time in panel and type of interview. The 
corresponding results are in line with those from our preferred benchmark specification. 
In view of widespread use of quadratic age controls and random effects we have also 
estimated such models and found similar comparison income effects for the two age groups in 
West Germany, and kept signs but lost significance in the UK. Surprisingly, random effects 
yielded the only significant and positive effect of comparison income for the younger group 
in East Germany. The quadratic age coefficients were almost always negative, and hence 
consistent with the results of our flexible age-interval estimates.  
Regional unemployment is a potential signalling variable, but refers to economic prospects 
for all. Its inclusion did not change the effects of comparison income, which is obviously a 
much more precise, micro-measure, in any of the three samples (nor did state-year 
interactions). Furthermore, comparison income is a relative indicator: if you are currently 
young and doing badly compared to your peers, their higher income suggests you could do 
better and improve your relative standing in the future.  
Finally, the age-happiness plots in Figure 1 were derived from estimates in the full samples 
with all ages, though we actually reject this specification. We therefore looked at age-interval 
coefficients in the subsamples and found similar patterns.  
 
4. Conclusions 
We present strong panel evidence for the tunnel effect in West Germany and the UK, with 
very robust positive comparison income coefficients for the subsample under 45, and the 
more familiar negative effects of comparison for older individuals. Surprisingly, with fixed 
effects these coefficients are equal in magnitude in West Germany, yielding no overall 
comparison effect for the full sample, in contrast to previous work with German SOEP data 
yielding a negative effect. Our panel estimates control for individual heterogeneity, and time 
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in the panel. Flexible age-interval dummies (instead of the usual quadratic) yield a hump-
shaped pure age pattern. In the UK, the comparison effect is still negative in the complete 
sample with all ages, and the own-income effect is much smaller than the comparison effect. 
In East Germany, fixed effects estimates show little significant comparison, suggesting a still-
different culture long after reunification.  
Our paper indicates that life-satisfaction and other measures of well-being clearly need to be 
estimated separately for young and old in future research, and that the explicit role of 
expectations, mobility and inequality seem worth exploring for their relevance to well-being 
and social comparison. Furthermore, our results provide an additional explanation for the 
observed trends in happiness in industrialized/developed countries. Due to ageing 
populations, and shrinking shares of young people (who are likely to experience gains in 
well-being from increasing reference income and economic growth), average happiness is 
more likely to stagnate. 
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Appendix 1 – Tables 
 
Table 1a: Summary Statistics, West Germany, 2000-2010 
 All <45 >=45 
Life-Satisfaction 7.15 (1.74) 7.22 (1.65) 7.08 (1.80) 
Age 48.21 (17.17) 32.61 (7.77) 61.10 (11.02) 
Household income  2878 (1868) 2876 (1661) 2879 (2023) 
Comparison income  2867 (799) 2901 (552) 2838 (955) 
N 157919 71425 86494 
Arithmetic means; standard deviations in parentheses. Life-Satisfaction measures self-reported life-
satisfaction on an 11-point scale. Age describes the age of the respondent. Household income 
measures the net monthly real household income of the respondent. Comparison income measures the 
average net monthly real income within a reference group (Age (-3/+6), Sex, Education (3 categories), 
Regions (4 categories)) to which the respondent belongs. Source: SOEP 
 
Table 1b: Summary Statistics, East Germany, 2000-2010 
 All <45 >=45 
Life-Satisfaction 6.55 (1.78) 6.73 (1.69) 6.42 (1.82) 
Age 48.70 (17.31) 31.77 (8.05) 60.90 (10.64) 
Household income  2250 (1295) 2351 (1255) 2177 (1319) 
Comparison income  2239 (560) 2360 (441) 2151 (618) 
N 56984 23864 33120 
See table 1a. Comparison income measures the average net monthly real income within a reference 
group group (Age (-3/+6), Sex, Education (3 categories), Regions (2 categories)) to which the 
respondent belongs. Source: SOEP 
 
Table 1c: Summary Statistics, GB, Waves 6-10 and UK, Waves 12-18 (across 1996/97-
2008/09) 
  All <45 >=45 
Life-Satisfaction       5.23       (1.29)       5.15       (1.21)      5.31       (1.36) 
Age     45.57     (18.38)     30.66       (8.32)     61.52     (11.53) 
Household income  2715.10 (2155.56) 3060.37 (2102.17) 2345.82 (2066.91) 
Comparison income  2680.10 (  886.50) 3060.16 (  622.30) 2273.61   (944.73) 
N 153189 79168 74021 
 
  
  
See table 1a. Life satisfaction measures self-reported life-satisfaction on a 7-point scale. Household 
income measures real household income, using the Consumer Prices Index as deflator. Comparison 
income measures the average real household income within a reference group (Age (-3/+6), Sex, 
Education (2 categories), Regions (3 categories)) to which the respondent belongs. Source: BHPS 
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Table 2a (1) (2) (3) 
West Germany, SOEP, 2000-2010 all <45 >=45 
Pooled OLS    
Household income 0.54*** 0.42*** 0.62*** 
 (51.64) (27.83) (43.96) 
Comparison income -0.09*** 0.19*** -0.19*** 
 (-3.30) (4.02) (-5.78) 
Observations 157,919 71,425 86,494 
Adj. R-squared 0.201 0.196 0.207 
Dependent variable: Life-Satisfaction. Controls for gender, marriage, cohabiting, children, health 
status, foreign-born, education, work status, interview form, time in panel, year of last interview, 
household size, age group, year of survey and federal states are included. Standard errors clustered at 
the level of skill groups, robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2b (1) (2) (3) 
East Germany, SOEP, 2000-2010 all <45 >=45 
Pooled OLS    
Household income 0.80*** 0.61*** 0.97*** 
 (42.22) (22.70) (36.77) 
Comparison income 0.05 0.28*** -0.10 
 (1.11) (3.60) (-1.53) 
Observations 56,984 23,864 33,120 
Adj. R-squared 0.221 0.216 0.222 
See table 2a. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2c (1) (2) (3) 
UK, BHPS, Waves 6-10, 12-18 all <45 >=45 
Pooled OLS    
Household income 0.086*** 0.114*** 0.054*** 
 (14.87) (15.09) (6.29) 
Comparison income -0.073*** 0.039 -0.086** 
 (-2.81) (1.00) (-2.38) 
Observations 153,189 79,168 74,021 
Adj. R-squared 0.166 0.147 0.182 
Dependent variable: Life-Satisfaction. Controls for gender, marital status (including cohabiting), 
children, health status, education, work status, time in panel, year of last interview, household size, 
age group, wave number and regions are included. Standard errors clustered at the level of skill 
groups, robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3a (1) (2) (3) 
West Germany, SOEP, 2000-2010 all <45 >=45 
Fixed Effects    
Household income 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.30*** 
 (14.90) (8.67) (11.82) 
Comparison income 0.01 0.24** -0.22*** 
 (0.16) (2.47) (-2.59) 
Observations 157,919 71,425 86,494 
Number of persons 27,521 15,093 15,316 
Adj. R-squared 0.0605 0.0690 0.0534 
Dependent variable: Life-Satisfaction. Controls for marriage, cohabiting, children, health status, 
foreign-born, education, work status, interview form, time in panel, year of last interview, household 
size, age group, year of survey and federal states are included. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level, robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 3b (1) (2) (3) 
East Germany, SOEP, 2000-2010 all <45 >=45 
Fixed Effects    
Household income 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.43*** 
 (12.23) (7.59) (8.88) 
Comparison income -0.01 0.14 -0.14 
 (-0.09) (0.90) (-0.82) 
Observations 56,984 23,864 33,120 
Number of persons 9,092 4,904 5,240 
Adj. R-squared 0.0572 0.0628 0.0522 
See table 3b. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 3c (1) (2) (3) 
UK, BHPS, Waves 6-10, 12-18 all <45 >=45 
Fixed Effects    
Household income 0.039*** 0.058*** 0.018* 
 (6.17) (6.86) (1.92) 
Comparison income -0.087* 0.260*** -0.290*** 
 (-1.91) (3.38) (-4.52) 
Observations 153,189 79,168 74,021 
Number of persons 25,681 16,327 12,034 
Adj. R-squared 0.0374 0.0420 0.0340 
Dependent variable: Life-Satisfaction. Controls for marital status (including cohabiting), children, 
health status, education, work status, time in panel, year of last interview, household size, age group, 
wave number and regions are included. Standard errors clustered at the individual level, robust t-
statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4a (1) (2) 
West Germany, SOEP, 2000-2010  Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
Interacted Model, full sample   
Household income 0.42*** 0.21*** 
 (27.70) (9.59) 
Household income*45+ 0.19*** 0.09*** 
 (9.36) (2.87) 
Comparison income 0.57*** 0.38*** 
 (5.84) (2.67) 
Comparison income*25-34 -0.47*** -0.26* 
 (-3.84) (-1.74) 
Comparison income*35-44 -0.48*** -0.19 
 (-4.52) (-1.36) 
Comparison income*45-54 -0.85*** -0.53*** 
 (-7.86) (-3.53) 
Comparison income*55-64 -0.87*** -0.56*** 
 (-8.16) (-3.78) 
Comparison income*65-74 -0.65*** -0.45*** 
 (-6.19) (-2.96) 
Comparison income*75+ -0.53*** -0.56*** 
 (-4.34) (-3.12) 
   
Observations 157,919 157,919 
Number of persons 27,521 27,521 
Adj. R-squared 0.204 0.0617 
Dependent variable: Life-Satisfaction. In addition to the variables listed in tables 2a and 3a, controls 
for interactions of all explanatory variables with a dummy for being older than 44 are included. 
Reference group of age groups: 18-24. 
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Table 4b (1) (2) 
East Germany, SOEP, 2000-2010  Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
Interacted Model, full sample   
Household income 0.61*** 0.34*** 
 (22.71) (8.91) 
Household income*45+ 0.35*** 0.10* 
 (9.42) (1.85) 
Comparison income 0.32** 0.31 
 (1.99) (1.51) 
Comparison income*25-34 -0.05 -0.22 
 (-0.27) (-0.86) 
Comparison income*35-44 -0.06 -0.16 
 (-0.35) (-0.63) 
Comparison income*45-54 -0.34* -0.37 
 (-1.92) (-1.46) 
Comparison income*55-64 -0.67*** -0.68*** 
 (-3.60) (-2.60) 
Comparison income*65-74 -0.18 -0.25 
 (-0.84) (-0.85) 
Comparison income*75+ -0.02 -0.37 
 (-0.08) (-0.94) 
   
Observations 56,984 56,984 
Number of persons 9,092 9,092 
Adj. R-squared 0.226 0.0591 
Dependent variable: Life-Satisfaction. In addition to the variables listed in tables 2b and 3b, controls 
for interactions of all explanatory variables with a dummy for being older than 44 are included. 
Reference group of age groups: 18-24. 
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Table 4c (1) (2) 
UK, BHPS, Waves 6-10, 12-18  Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
Interacted Model, full sample   
Household income 0.115*** 0.055*** 
 (15.14) (6.63) 
Household income*45+ -0.060*** -0.038*** 
 (-5.23) (-3.12) 
Comparison income 0.114* 0.127 
 (1.69) (1.36) 
Comparison income*25-34 -0.032 0.023 
 (-0.49) (0.29) 
Comparison income*35-44 -0.141** -0.016 
 (-2.13) (-0.18) 
Comparison income*45-54 -0.035 -0.153 
 (-0.42) (-1.32) 
Comparison income*55-64 -0.233*** -0.247** 
 (-2.92) (-2.15) 
Comparison income*65-74 -0.296*** -0.391*** 
 (-3.71) (-3.27) 
Comparison income*75+ -0.151 -0.734*** 
 (-1.59) (-5.14) 
   
Observations 153,189 153,189 
Number of persons 25,681 25,681 
Adj. R-squared 0.170 0.0387 
Dependent variable: Life-Satisfaction. In addition to the variables listed in tables 2c and 3c, controls 
for interactions of all explanatory variables with a dummy for being at least 45 are included. 
Reference group of age groups: under 25. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
-0.05 
0 
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
0.2 
0.25 
0.3 
25 35 45 55 65 75 99 
Pure age-happiness effects over the life cycle 
West-Germany East-Germany UK 
25 
 
Appendix 2 
A Model of Happiness over the Life Cycle 
Theory  
In this section we set out a model that supports our empirical findings – specifically the 
finding that, in the early stages of working life, the average income of the comparison group 
may have either a positive or insignificant effect on reported happiness or life-satisfaction.  
The essential insight we wish to capture is that life-satisfaction may depend on not just a 
comparison of a person’s own current income with the current income of their peers, but also 
on a comparison of how their life as a whole is going relative to their peers, and so on relative 
lifetime income. Of course early in their working life people do not know for sure how their 
lives might pan out and, in particular, how not just their own lifetime income but that of the 
comparison group will evolve. So they use information about how their life has gone to date – 
specifically their current income and that of their peers – to draw inferences about how things 
might go in the future. In this context a high current income of the comparison group may 
signal that there has been a significant amount of promotion to date and hence future 
promotion prospects and so expectations of relative future lifetime income are good.  
The aim of the model is to formalise this idea and show that there are indeed contexts in 
which, in the earlier part of working life, the current income of the comparison group may be 
positively associated with reported happiness. 
The Model 
The model is framed in a way that is consistent with the data on which the empirical analysis 
has been conducted. So it is assumed that individuals’ working lives are split into two 
periods.  
We also assume that all individuals have a comparison/peer group with whom they compare 
how their lives are going. Accordingly we consider a sub-population of individuals who are 
identical in terms of some observable characteristics: age, educational attainment, location 
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etc. This constitutes the comparison/peer group to which everyone within the sub-population 
compares themselves.  
Though identical in certain respects, individuals differ in some other characteristics that are 
unobservable to them but will manifest themselves over the course of their lifetime in two 
different respects: 
 Individuals may turn out to be Hares or Tortoises. Hares show early promise and get 
promoted early (in period 1). Tortoises develop more slowly, and get promoted, if at 
all, later in life – in period 2. Individuals learn in period 1 whether or not they have 
been promoted and hence whether they are Hares or Tortoises. So in period 1 the 
current income of a Tortoise is 1Tc b  where b > 0 denotes basic income, while the 
current income of a Hare is 1 (1 )Hc b    where 0   is the proportionate income 
supplement obtained through promotion in Period 1. 
 Individuals may turn out to be genuinely Smart or basically Dull. Smartness only 
manifests itself in period 2, and leads to Smart people – Tortoises or Hares – being 
promoted (further promoted) in Period 2. It is assumed that Smart Tortoises turn out to 
equally smart as Smart Hares and so, in period 2, their current incomes are 
2 2 (1 )ST SHc c b       where 0   represents a smartness factor – the extent to 
which promoted people get an extra income supplement to reflect the value of real 
smartness rather than the flashiness of a Hare. In Period 2 some of the Hares who 
were promoted in period 1 will turn out not to actually have much substance and will 
be Dull Hares. Having already been promoted they tread water in terms of income and 
so in period 2 get current income 2 (1 )DHc b   . Finally Dull Tortoises don’t get 
promoted in period 2 either and so end up with current income 2DTc b . 
For simplicity it is assumed that these two manifested characteristics – flashiness and 
smartness – are independently distributed in the population. Let , 0 1H Hp p   be the 
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proportion of people who are Hares, and , 0 1S Sp p   be the proportion of people who are 
Smart. 
In period 1 the average current income of the group is 
  1 1 11 (1 )H TH H Hc p c p c b p      ,  
while in period 2 it is  
      2 11 1 1S S H S Hc b p p p c p b p                      
It is assumed that the happiness experienced by each person in each period depends on  
i. A comparison of their current income with the average current income of their peers. 
ii. A comparison of their view of their lifetime income with the average lifetime income 
of their peers. In period 1 lifetime income is not fully known so individuals have to 
estimate both their own lifetime income and the average lifetime income of their 
peers.  
It follows from the above assumptions that, at the end of Period 1: 
 the expected lifetime income of a Hare is 
   1 12
eH H
Sy c p b   
 the expected lifetime income of a Tortoise is  1 12eT T Sy c p b      
 the expected average lifetime income of the peer group is  11 2 1S Hy c p b p       . 
Now suppose that although, for individuals, the probability of being Smart is the same 
whether they are a Hare or a Tortoise, nevertheless in the population as a whole, the 
proportion of Smart people is related to the proportion of Hares by  
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     S Hp p 12    (1) 
It follows from this that, at the end of Period 1: 
 the expected lifetime income of a Hare is 
   1 12
eH H
Hy c p b       (2) 
 the expected lifetime income of a Tortoise is  1 12eT T Hy c p b         (3) 
 the expected average lifetime income of the peer group is 
    211 2 H Hy c p b p b b     .   (4) 
Information structure 
The information structure of the model is as follows.  
 At the outset, and throughout their lives, individuals know: the values of 
 and    –
the income premiums to flashiness and smartness respectively; the relationship 
between period 1 and period 2 incomes conditional on being of various types; and the 
relationship between   and  S Hp p  as given by (1). 
 However initially they do not know the economic prospects for their cohort – whether 
they have skills that will turn out to be in high demand and lead to high opportunities 
for promotion. That is, initially they do not know the values of b and Hp .  
  However in Period 1 they learn their own income and that of their peers, and so, by 
comparing them, they know whether they have turned out be a Hare or a Tortoise. 
Formally, they learn 1 , ,
jc j H T
 ; the average income of their peers, 1c ; their 
                                                          
12
 We could make the more general assumption that  
1
, 0S H
H
p p
p
   
 , but that adds very little to 
the analysis. 
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current income relative to that of their peers, 11
1
, ,
j
c j c
r j H T
c
   and hence their 
type H or T. Also from what they learn in Period 1 they can deduce the values of b 
and Hp  and hence, from (1), the value of their future promotion prospects, Sp . Using 
this they can use (2), (3) and (4) to calculate their own expected lifetime income and 
the average of that of their peers.  
 In period 2 everything is revealed. Individuals learn the value of their current income 
in period 2 and the average current income of their peers. Comparing their current 
income in period 2 to that earned in period 1, they learn whether they are Smart or 
Dull, so they now fully know their type. They can now carry out a full comparison of 
how their life has gone relative to their peers in terms of both their relative current 
income and their relative lifetime income. Formally individuals learn their period two 
income 2 , , ; ,jkc j S D k H T   and hence their type , , ; ,jk j S D k H T  . 
They also learn the average period 2 income of their peers 2c .13 Individuals therefore 
know their full lifetime income 2 1 2 , , ; ,jk k jky c c j S D k H T     and the average 
lifetime income of their peers: 1 22y c c  . 
Implications 
Having set out the assumptions of the model, we now derive the implications. The 
fundamental issue we want to investigate is how the average current income of the peer group 
in each of the two periods affects each individual’s reported happiness, taking as given their 
own income. In particular we want to explore the possibility that, although a higher level of 
peer income in Period 1 lowers relative current income, it might raise expected relative 
lifetime income, since it sends a signal about higher promotion prospects in the future. 
Unfolding Lives 
                                                          
13
 Though they were able to work this out in period 1. 
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Period 1 
Hares 
In period 1 Hares learn their current income 1 (1 )Hc b    and the average income of their 
peers, 1 (1 )Hc b p   . Hence they know their relative current period 1 income 
    
1
1
1
1
H
c H c
r
c
   
which is, of course, a strictly decreasing function of the average period 1 income of their 
peers. 
From this they calculate: 
   
11 1(1 );
1 (1 )
H H
H
c c cb bp          (5) 
 Substitute (5) into (2) and (4) to get: 
   
11 1
1
2 (1 ) (1 )
(1 )
H H
eH
c c c
y
             (6) 
   
  21 1 11 1
1
1
12 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 )
H H
H
H
c c c c c
cy
     
 
                (7) 
where 1
H
y  is the average lifetime income that Hares expect their peers to get on the basis of 
the information available to Hares in Period 1. 
It is straightforward to show that 
 1 1
1 1
( ) 2 1
0
H
eH
Hpy y
c c
               (8) 
so, other things being equal, the higher is the current income of their peers, the higher is the 
realised proportion of Hares in the population, and so, from (1), the greater the promotion 
prospects they face in Period 2. This raises Hares’ estimated value of their own lifetime 
income, but also that of their peers, and indeed the latter increases by more than the former. 
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Now from (6) and (7), in Period 1 Hares expect to end up with a relative lifetime income: 
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 (9) 
It is straightforward to show that  
       1 22(1 ) 12(1 ) 1 1y eH HH H Hpr p p p              (10) 
and so, as we know must be the case, the expected lifetime income of Hares is greater than 
the expected lifetime income of their peers.  
By differentiating (9) w.r.t 1c  we get: 
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which, from (8) and (10) is strictly negative, so the relative lifetime income expected by 
Hares in period 1 is a decreasing function of average current income of their peers, and so too 
is their happiness. 
Tortoises 
In period 1 Tortoises learn their current income 1Tc b  and the average income of their peers, 
1 (1 )Hc b p   . Hence they know their relative current period 1 income 
    
1
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1
T
c T c
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       (12)  
which is, of course, a strictly decreasing function of the average period 1 income of their 
peers. 
From this information Tortoises can also work out:  
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Substitute (13) into (3) and (4) to get: 
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where 1
T
y  is the average lifetime income that Tortoises expect their peers to get on the basis 
of the information available to Tortoises in Period 1. 
It is straightforward to show that 
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               (16) 
so, just as with Hares, the higher is the current income of their peers, the higher is the realised 
proportion of Hares in the population, and so, from (1), the greater the promotion prospects 
that Tortoises face in Period 2. This raises Tortoises’ estimated value of their own lifetime 
income, but also that of their peers, and indeed the latter increases by more than the former. 
Now from (14) and (15), in Period 1 Tortoises expect to end up with a relative lifetime 
income: 
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It is straightforward to show that  
      1 2 ( ) 12 2y eT HH H Hpr p p p             (18) 
and so, as we know must be the case, the expected lifetime income of Tortoises is lower than 
the expected lifetime income of their peers.  
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By differentiating (18) w.r.t 1c  we get: 
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Consequently 
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Substitute (16) into (20) and we get: 
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It is clear that if 0Hp   then 1
1
0
y eT
r
c
  , whereas if 1Hp   then 11 0y eTrc  , so the conclusion 
is that if Hp  is sufficiently large then an increase in the average income earned by their peers 
in Period 1 raises the expected relative lifetime income of Tortoises and so, potentially their 
happiness. 
Period Two 
This is straightforward.  
Each type of individual knows their current period 2 income, 2 , , ; ,jkc j S D k H T   and 
the average period 2 income of their peers 2c
. 
Consequently they can work out their relative 
current income  
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which is a strictly decreasing function of the average income of their peers.  
Each individual also sees clearly their relative performance in terms of lifetime income 
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and this too is a strictly decreasing function of the average period 2 income of their peers 2c
. 
 
So, unambiguously, happiness of all individuals is a strictly decreasing function of the 
average period 2 income of their peers 2c
. 
  
Conclusion 
Though very simple this model seems to be capable of generating predictions that are 
consistent with the empirical evidence, namely that, under some circumstances and for some 
individuals an increase in the average current income earned by their peers may make people 
happier early in life, because of the signalling role it plays on prospects for future relative 
lifetime income. However later in life when everything has been learned, then, ceteris 
paribus, the higher the current income of their peers the worse people think they have 
performed in relative terms whether this is viewed in terms of just current performance or, 
looking back over one’s life, in terms of lifetime performance. 
